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1 Introduction
The assumption on profit maximization underlies most of economic methodol-
ogy. When it comes to justifying it as a statement about how firms actually
behave, the ‘as if’ argument is frequently invoked. That argument states that
firms which do not maximize profits will be eliminated by competition, because
competition drives profits to zero. Hence, non maximizers make losses and are
therefore eliminated.
The argument, however, ignores another aspect of competition: that agents
who bid more get a large chunk of resources. If there are all sorts of irrational
agents participating in the competition process, the highest bidder is unlikely
to be a profit maximizer. Rather, it will be an agent which has overestimated
its benefits and underestimated its costs.
Consider the following examples:
• Firms compete to sell the same good, they have the same costs, and there
are constant returns to scale. A (possibly tiny) fraction of firms ”gets
it wrong” and charges below cost. The firm which gets it wrong most
gets the whole market—and experiences large losses. Thus, in this simple
∗I thank Omar Licandro, Ana Ania, and participants at the European Economic Associa-
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setting, from an allocative perspective, profit maximizers do not matter:
the allocation of resources is determined by the firm that has made the
largest downward mistake in setting its price.
• Entrepreneurs have different projects and compete for funds. They observe
their return with an error. Those who most overestimate their returns
are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate, thus overbidding rational
entrepreneurs. If making a large mistake is correlated with having a low
true return, funds are channel to the wrong projects—and many borrowers
will go bankrupt.
• Mobile phone operators are competing in auction for frequencies. Those
who most overestimate the value get awarded the frequencies. Again,
that results in a misallocation of resources if these operators are at the
same time not the most efficient. Recent evidence by Lee and Malmendier
(2006) documents such phenomenon on e-bay auctions.
Of course, mistaken agents will eventually be eliminated, because they will
run out of funds. Nevertheless, that selection process might have no impact
on the allocation of resources. In the first example given above, we only need
that there exists one producer selling below cost for rational ones to lose the
whole market. Suppose that firms are eliminated if, say, their cumulated losses
reach some threshold. Then those producers eventually disappear. But as long
as there are some entrants that charge below cost, the argument still carries
through.
Thus, selection in economics operates very differently from selection in na-
ture. In nature, the less efficient organisms get access to fewer resources, have
lower fitness, and eventually disappear from the population. In economics, the
less efficient organisms can temporarily send market signals that will grant them
more resources than others. While that does not prevent them from being even-
tually eliminated, it nevertheless implies that resources may be allocated in a
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way quite different from what our familiar notion of equilibrium predicts.1
An important question, therefore, is whether and how markets can put in
place mechanisms that limit the lame ducks’ ability to draw resources; and, if
such mechanisms emerge, how they affect equilibrium. These mechanisms are
bound to be financial institutions that restrict the access to funds of inefficient
firms and increase their availability for efficient ones. What sort of institutions
should emerge, and how well are they functioning? Does the economy converge
to a Walrasian equilibrium, or do inefficient organizations persistently access a
large share of the resources?
This paper is a step toward analyzing these issues. I examine the interplay
between the allocation of funds by rational savers to imperfectly rational firms,
and the bidding process described above. I first set up a model of competition
between boundedly rational firms. I assume that firms differ by their cost and
set prices in a rigid, naive, fashion. Customers try to get the lowest price. Firms
need cash to pay their inputs in advance, and savers-shareholders allocate cash
between them so as to maximize their rate of return. Thus, while customers are
attracted by firm that tend to charge too low prices, shareholders are attracted
by firms that tend to charge too high prices.
I first describe the equilibrium when the rate of return on each firm is ob-
served. In such a case, obviously, firms that charge below cost do not get any
funds. Nevertheless, the allocation of funds is not necessarily efficient and the
fact that firms follow naive rules has important consequences. It is shown that
there are multiple equilibria, and that, relative to the Walrasian equilibrium,
some degree of monopoly power is sustained. That is, in some equilibria, firms
that charge ”too high” prices and could be undercut by profitable firms get
all the funds. The reason for multiplicity is a pecuniary externality, by which
1A corollary is that limiting the extent of competition may in fact increase the efficiency
of the market. In a world with such mistakes, it is easy to think of government interventions
that by limiting competition, increase the social surplus. For example, in Saint-Paul (2002),
I show how restrictions on transaction prices may increase welfare in a model where people
misperceive their opportunity cost of participating in a match.
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reallocating funds in favor of a firm affects the customer base of other firms.
In this setting, selection of firms by shareholders and customers therefore
tends to allocate resources to firms that ”overprice” rather than those that
”underprice”.
Things can be different, however, if there are new entrants whose price is
unobserved. The shareholders’ problem is then: which fraction of my savings
shall I allocate to new entrants, whose rate of return is unobservable. If en-
trants get a positive fraction of savings, then entrants that underprice will get
a disproportionate fraction of customers, although the expected rate of return
of giving funds to entrants must of course remain positive. One can show again
that there may be multiple equilibria, for example an equilibrium where all
funds go to entrants can coexist with an equilibrium where no funds go to en-
trants. The former equilibrium will typically involve more bankruptcy, and also
more growth if one is in a dynamic setting where entrants are on average more
productive than incumbents.
The literature on the evolutionary behavior of firms competing within a sin-
gle market, is firmly in the ”equilibrium selection” tradition. See, for example,
Alos-Ferrer et al. (2000), who, following Vega-Redondo (1997), study a model
where the evolutionary stable outcome is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria.
Here the approach is different in the sense that there is no underlying game, the
equilibrium strategies of which agents are supposed to learn. Rather, firms are
genuinely making mistakes and we want to know how strong a force ‘economic
selection’ is in correcting these mistakes and leading to the efficient outcome.
The novelty of this paper is that selection is made by agents — customers and
shareholders — whose fitness depend on different things — profits and utility —
and whose behavior tends to select different firms. Nevertheless, this paper is
not totally at variance with that literature since some convergence results to the
Walrasian equilibrium hold when cash becomes infinitely abundant.
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2 A static model of mispricing
In this section, I introduce a simple model that I will use extensively to ana-
lyze the issues at hand. The model is extreme in that the only equilibrating
mechanism in the economy is the way savers allocate funds between firms. That
is, each firm is characterized by a particular behavior and this behavior does
not change; all what can happen is that shareholders select their most preferred
firms by withdrawing funds from the least successful firms and reallocating them
to the most successful ones. In reality — and in a more general setting — we ex-
pect both selection and firms’ decision to intervene. However, it will still be
true that if a firm is intrinsically less good than another at organizing, pricing,
buying, delivering, and so on, it should eventually attract less funds.
In the model, firms differ in their cost and only have one decision variable:
their price. Unlike the standard model, the price of any given firm is assumed
exogenous (while the focus is quite different, that relates the present analysis
to the fixed-price equilibrium theory (Bénassy, 1982)). That is, their pricing
behavior is an intrinsic characteristic, just like their cost. If a firm, say, charges
a price far too high, it cannot increase its profits by lowering it. However, as
we shall see, its shareholders can starve it of funds and reallocate funds to a
firm with a more profitable pricing behavior. Similarly, a firm which prices
below cost makes negative profits, and while this particular firm cannot ever be
profitable, shareholders can ”close” it by refusing to allocate funds to it.
In order to capture this fund allocation mechanism, I assume that firms
need cash in order to buy their inputs in advance. Cash is provided before
trade takes place by ”savers”: in the first period of the model, savers provide
cash to firms. After trade has taken place, each firm rebates cash to the savers
who have financed it, proportionally to each contribution—thus we can think of
these savers as the firm’s ”shareholders”. Each saver’s utility is increasing in
the amount of cash he ends up with at the end of the game.
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More precisely: there are N firms, all producing a single homogenous good.
In addition to that good, there are two other goods, ”cash” and an input good.
Cash is the numéraire, and the price of the input good is normalized to one,
which is just a choice of measurement units.
Firm i has a cost ci and a price pi. Without loss of generality, I assume
that firms are ranked by increasing prices: pj ≥ pi, j > i. Thus the production
function for firm i is
yi = xi/ci,
where yi is the firm’s output and xi is the amount of input it purchases.
It is important to note that firms are not decision units but automata which
mechanically produce and charge a price pi.
In order to purchase inputs, firms need a good called ”cash”. It is provided
by agents called ”savers”, who voluntarily provide cash to the firm they want
(thus there is no ”market” for cash and savers are thought of as shareholders who
provide capital to firms). If ki is the cash of firm i, then it faces the following
”cash-in-advance” constraint:
xi ≤ ki.
Consumers buy the output good from firms, and pay them with cash. Thus,
before trade takes place, firms are endowed with cash by savers and use it to
purchase inputs, and after trade has taken place, they hold whatever cash they
had left after buying their inputs plus the cash they obtained after selling their
product.
While firms are not rational, consumers are, and try to buy from the cheap-
est producer. The demand curve for the good is D(p). Because of the cash-in-
advance constraint, a producer may be unable to serve demand. Those con-
sumers who are not serve then try to buy from the next producer in the price
ranking, and so on. Therefore, the allocation mechanism is recursively defined
as follows:
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• The demand addressed to producer i is γiD(pi), with γ1 = 1.
• The output of producer i is yi = min(γiD(pi), ki/ci).
• If γiD(pi) ≤ ki/ci, then the demand addressed to all producers such that
j > i is zero (since pj ≥ pi, there is no additional demand for these
producers). That is, γj = 0. In such a case, i is the highest-priced firm
with a positive output; we denote the index of this firm by imax.
• If γiD(pi) > ki/ci, then producer i’s customers are rationed. Rationing is
proportional, so that the demand addressed to producer i+1 is γi+1D(pi+1),
where
γi+1 = γi
µ
1− ki/ci
γiD(pi)
¶
= γi −
ki/ci
D(pi)
.
Iterating, it is easy to get the scale factor for demand addressed to any
producer i ≥ 2 :
γi = max
⎛
⎝1−
i−1X
j=1
kj/cj
D(pj)
, 0
⎞
⎠
= 1−
i−1X
j=1
yj
D(pj)
, (1)
where the last inequality comes from the fact that if γi > 0, then yj = kj/cj
for all j < i; and for the ”marginal” producer such that γiD(pi) ≤ ki/ci,
yi = γiD(pi), so that 0 = γi− yi/D(pi) = 1−
Pi
j=1
yj
D(pj)
= γi+1, and so on for
all producers of higher prices.
The total amount of cash in the economy is K. It is uniformly allocated
among a continuum of savers of total mass 1. I shall assume that there is enough
cash so that all consumers are served. A sufficient condition for that is2
2To see this, assume there exists an allocation such that even consumers at the highest
price firm are constrained. For this to be the case, it must be that γND(pN ) > kN/cN , or
equivalently
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K ≥ max
i
ciD(pi) (2)
We shall denote by S the set of allocations of output {yi} that derive from
an allocation of cash {ki} such that
P
ki = K. Given the previous inequality,
this set does not depend on the actual value of K. The preceding arguments
can be summarized by Proposition 1, which characterizes how the allocation of
output derives from the allocation of cash:
PROPOSITION 1 — Let imax = min{i,
Pi−1
j=1
kj
cjD(pj)
≥ 1}, which by ( 2)
exists. For any given allocation of cash {k1, ..., kN}, the allocation of output is
yi = ki/ci for all i < imax,
yimax =
⎛
⎝1−
imax−1X
j=1
kj
cjD(pj)
⎞
⎠D(pimax),
and yi = 0, for all i > imax.
I know describe how cash is allocated between firms and then rebated to
shareholders at the end of the game.
Assume shareholders are indexed by λ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the allocation of cash
can be represented by a function ki(λ), which is the density of cash given to
firm i by savers λ. One has Z 1
0
ki(λ)dλ = ki,∀i
Furthermore, assuming that all cash must be given to firms, it must also be
that—since K is uniformly allocated—
NX
i=1
ki(λ) = K,∀λ.
1−
NX
j=1
kj
cjD(pj)
> 0.
That cannot be, since, as
P
kj = K, the LHS is smaller than 1−K/maxj cjD(pj) < 0.
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After trade has taken place, the amount of cash held by firm i, k0i, is equal
to its revenue plus whatever cash it had left after buying its inputs:
k0i = ki + piyi − ciyi. (3)
This cash is rebated to shareholders in a proportional way, so that a saver with
index λ gets an amount of cash equal to
k0i(λ) =
k0i
ki
ki(λ).
Note that this is easily interpreted as the firm paying dividends to its share-
holders, proportionally to the number of shares they hold.
The utility of savers V (λ) is just equal to the total amount of cash they get
at the end of the game:
V (λ) =
NX
i=1
k0i(λ).
The questions we want to answer in that model are: what is the equilibrium
allocation of cash? What is the equilibrium allocation of production between
firms? In order to interpret the answers, it is useful to have a benchmark; a
natural one is the social optimum, which we discuss next.
3 Optimum
Before describing the equilibrium, we first discuss the allocation of cash which
maximizes social welfare.
In the model, there are two kinds of agents: consumers who consume the
output good, and savers who consume cash. In principle, one could consider
different criteria that differ depending on the relative weight of savers. How-
ever, given that cash is the numéraire, the most natural criterion in this partial
equilibrium model is to have a weight of 1 on the saver’s cash holding and add
them to consumer surplus, which is equivalent to the traditional welfare analysis
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in partial equilibrium models, where producer’s surplus is added to consumer’s
surplus.
The previous section has shown that in equilibrium, firms such that i < imax
produce yi = ki/ci, while firm imax serves all its residual demand: yimax =
γimaxD(pimax). Given proportional rationing, consumer surplus at firm i ≤ imax
is given by
CSi =
yi
D(pi)
Z +∞
pi
D(q)dq.
Furthermore, the contribution to saver’s welfare of that firm is simply k0i as
given by (3). Total social welfare is therefore equal to
SW =
imaxX
i=1
CSi + k
0
i
= K +
imaxX
i=1
yiωi,
where
ωi =
1
D(pi)
Z +∞
pi
D(q)dq + pi − ci.
Note that ωi only depends on firm i’s characteristics and does not depend
on the allocation of cash between firms.
The preceding steps show that maximizing social welfare is equivalent to
maximizing
Pimax
i=1 yiωi; furthermore, it is easy to see that picking up an allo-
cation of cash is equivalent to picking up a sequence of yi which satisfies the
proper constraints. That is spelled out in Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1 — The two following properties are equivalent
(A) {y1, ..., yN} ∈ S
(B) 0 ≤ yi ≤ D(pi)
h
1−
Pi−1
j=1
yj
D(pj)
i
, for all i, with yN = D(pN )
h
1−
PN−1
j=1
yj
D(pj)
i
.
PROOF — That (A) implies (B) comes from the fact that (1) holds and that
yi ≤ γiD(pi). Conversely, consider an allocation of output which satisfies (B).
Let imax = min{i, yi = D(pi)
h
1−
PN−1
j=1
yi
D(pi)
i
}. Clearly, yi = 0 for i > imax.
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Set ki = ciyi for i < imax and kimax = K −
Pimax−1
j=1 ki. Set ki = 0 for i >
imax. Then we can check that this allocation of ki yields the desired allocation
of yi. To see that, just note that it is associated with the sequence of γi’s
defined by (1), which by construction satisfies ki/ci < γiD(pi) for i < imax and
kimax/cimax ≥ γimaxD(pimax). To check the latter, note that it is equivalent to
K ≥
Pimax
j=1 ciyi =
Pimax
j=1 (ciD(pi))
yi
D(pi)
. As
Pimax
j=1
yi
D(pi)
= 1,this expression is
always lower than max (ciD(pi)), which according to (2) is lower than K. QED.
From Lemma 1 we conclude that the social planner problem is equiva-
lent to maximizing
PN
i=1 yiωi, subject to the set of constraints 0 ≤ yi ≤
D(pi)
h
1−
Pi−1
j=1
yj
D(pj)
i
. But as these constraints may be rewritten as
Pi
j=1
yj
D(pj)
≤
1, for nonnegative values of yi they can be reduced to a single constraint:
NX
j=1
yj
D(pj)
= 1. (4)
From here we can straightforwardly show
LEMMA 2 — Let si = D(pi)ωi =
R +∞
pi
D(q)dq + (pi − ci)D(pi) be the total
surplus generated by firm i if it had the whole market. The allocation of produc-
tion that maximizes social welfare is defined by yj = hjD(pj), where hj is the
set of weights which maximize
PN
i=1 hisi, subject to hi ≥ 0 and
PN
i=1 hi = 1.
Thus, the social optimum maximizes a weighted average of the social surplus
generated by each firm if it had the whole market. That is a convenient property
of the proportional rationing scheme: the demand curve faced by any firm is
proportional to the demand curve for the whole market, so that its contribution
to overall surplus is proportional to si.
As a result, the optimal allocation of cash consists in giving all of it to the
firm that generates the highest surplus:
PROPOSITION 2 — An allocation of production {yi}, yi ≥ 0, maximizes
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social welfare if and only if:
{y1, ..., yN} ∈ S, i.e. (4) holds,
and
yi > 0 =⇒ i ∈ argmax
i
si.
Note that if the social planner could set prices, the first-best allocation would
be simply reached by picking up the lowest cost firm, giving it all the cash and
setting its price equal to its cost. Here that strategy may not be optimal, as
this firm may misprice its output in such a way that some other firm generates
a higher surplus.
An interesting special case is the case where all firms have the same cost c,
i.e. all firms have the same technology and the only mistakes they make is when
setting their price. As we know that total surplus
R +∞
p
D(q)dq+(p− c)D(p) is
hump-shaped and maximized at p = c, the optimal allocation implies giving all
the cash to one of the two firms whose price is closest to c (the one from above
and the one from below).
4 Equilibrium
We now characterize the equilibrium of this economy. To do so, we must first
define what equilibrium is. Savers want to maximize their ex-post cash-holdings.
Thus, we define equilibrium as a situation where an individual saver cannot
increase his return by changing his allocation of cash.
DEFINITION — An allocation of cash {ki(λ)} is in equilibrium iff
@ λ0, (∀ dλ > 0,∃ {k˜i(λ)},
P
k˜i(λ) = K and (∀i,∀λ /∈ [λ0,λ0 + dλ], k˜i(λ) =
ki(λ)), and
P
i k˜
0
i(λ) >
P
i k˜i(λ)).
This formula tells us that an infinitesimal mass of savers around any λ0
cannot make more money by changing their allocation of savings.
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Intuitively, given that dividends are proportional to the amount of cash
given to the firm, savers want to allocate cash to the firms with the highest rate
of return. Furthermore, given that savers are infinitesimal, the distribution of
rates of return is not affected, at the first order, by any reallocation of individual
savings.
PROPOSITION 3 — Consider an allocation of capital {ki(λ)},and the asso-
ciated allocation of output {yi} and end-of-period cash {k0i}. Let ri, the ”rate
of return” of firm i, be defined as
ri = pi/ci, i < imax
rimax = 1 + γimaxD(pimax)(pimax − cimax)/kimax
ri = 1, i > imax.
Then the allocation is in equilibrium if and only if
ki > 0 =⇒ i ∈ argmax
i
{ri}.
PROOF – Consider a small reallocation of cash {dki}.3 To be feasible it
must satisfy
PN
i=1 dki = 0, as well as dki ≥ 0 if ki = 0. Because it is infinitesimal,
imax is unchanged. As dividends are proportional to ki(λ), the net earnings
generated by this reallocation are equal to
dk0 =
NX
i=1
k0i + dk
0
i
ki + dki
dki,
where dk0i is the change in k
0
i induced by the change in {ki}. Clearly, we have
dk0i =
pi
ci
dki for i < imax, dk0i = dki for i > imax, and dk
0
i = dki for i = imax (as
cash is unused at the margin for that firm). Let us denote by ri =
k0i+dk
0
i
ki+dki
the
rate of return on equity for firm i. In equilibrium, one must have dk0 ≤ 0 for all
feasible reallocations dki. That is equivalent to dki < 0 being infeasible for any
firm such that ri < rj , i.e. to ki = 0. Thus an equilibrium allocation is such
that all cash is allocated to firms with the highest rate of return.
3More formally, we can assume that an infinitesimal mass dλ of savers around some value
of λ changes its allocation from ki(λ) to k˜i(λ), and define dki = dλ.(k˜i(λ)− ki(λ)).
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Next, we can compute ri. We get ri = pi/ci for all i < imax (regardless on
whether ki = 0 or not), and ri = 1 for all i > imax. The rate of return on
firm imax is finally given by rimax = k
0
imax
/kimax = 1 + γimaxD(pimax)(pimax −
cimax)/kimax . QED
Comparing Proposition 3 to Proposition 2, we see that the market maximizes
rates of return, while the social planner maximizes surplus. Furthermore, a
firm’s rate of return depends on the whole allocation, while a firm’s surplus is
independent of the allocation.
Proposition 3 only gives us a way of computing the equilibrium, it does not
characterize it. We now provide results that characterize the equilibrium. In
order to do so, we shall make the following assumption, which holds almost
surely:
ASSUMPTION 1 — i 6= j =⇒ pi/ci 6= pj/cj .
This assumption implies that two constrained firms cannot have the same
rate of return. Consequently, there cannot be two constrained firms in equilib-
rium. As all firms but one are constrained, there cannot be more than two firms
with a positive output in equilibrium.
Another assumption that we shall make, is that there exists at least one
profitable firm:
ASSUMPTION 2 — ∃i, pi > ci.
That assumption guarantees that no non profitable firm gets any cash, since
the profitable firms yield a return ri ≥ 1 — in the worst possible case, they
attract no customer, yielding ri = 1.
In order to rule out some borderline cases, we shall also assume
ASSUMPTION 3 — ∀i, pi 6= ci.
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That assumption also holds almost surely. Note that it does not preclude a
firm’s price from being arbitrarily close to its cost, but it just prevents it from
being right on target.
The following Lemma formalizes the restriction on equilibrium implied by
these assumptions:
LEMMA 3 — Assume assumptions 1 and 2 hold; then
(i) in any equilibrium yi = 0 for at least N − 2 firms
(ii) in any equilibrium ki = 0 if yi = 0 or pi < ci.
PROOF — Assume there are 3 firms i, j, k, such that i < j < k and yi, yj , yk >
0. Then i < imax and j < jmax, implying ri = pi/ci and rj = pj/cj . Be-
cause of assumption 1, ri 6= rj . As both firms produce, ki, kj > 0. Thus,
i, j ∈ argmaxi{ri} (Proposition 3), implying ri = rj , which is a contradiction.
This proves (i).
Assume there is a firm such that pi < ci and ki > 0. Then ri < 1. Let i0 such
that pi0 > ci0 . Then r0i ≥ 1 > ri, which violates Proposition 3.
Assume there is a firm such that ki > 0 and yi = 0. Then ri = 1 and there
exists i0 < i such that yi > 0. Otherwise, firm i would be the cheapest available
firm and would attract some consumers, whom it could serve. It must then be
that ki0 > 0, so that ri0 ≥ 1,which in turn implies pi0 ≥ ci0 . As pi0 = ci0 is ruled
out, one must actually have pi0 > ci0 . Then, it must be that ri0 > 1 = ri, which
again violates proposition 3.
Q.E.D.
Putting (i) and (ii) together, we see that at most two firms get cash in any
equilibrium. To characterize it, one just has to try and construct equilibria
where one firm gets all the cash, and equilibria where output is split between
firm i which is constrained and firm imax which is not. It turns out that the latter
are unstable in an economically meaningful sense; that is, if cash is marginally
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reallocated in favor of one of the two firms, its rate of return moves above that
of the other firm, thus reinforcing the initial move. Formally, we can live with
the following simple notion of stability:
DEFINITION — An equilibrium is pairwise stable if and only if
(i) ∀i, j s.t. i 6= j, kikj > 0,
∂rj
∂ki
+
∂ri
∂kj
>
∂rj
∂kj
+
∂ri
∂ki
.
(ii) ∀i, j s.t. ki > kj = 0, ri > rj
Condition (i) states that if one reallocates one unit of cash from firm i to j,
the change in firm j’s rate of return, ∂rj∂kj −
∂rj
∂ki
, is lower than that of firm i’s
rate of return (which is initially equal to rj), −( ∂ri∂ki −
∂ri
∂kj
). Thus, cash would
naturally tend to go back to firm i. Condition (ii) states that firms that do get
cash get a strictly higher rate of return than firm’s that do not. Therefore,
moving an infinitesimal unit of cash to these firms would, by continuity, result
in a lower rate of return than in the original firm, which would again create an
incentive for cash to return to the original firm.
Then:
LEMMA 4 — An equilibrium such that ki > 0 for more than one firm is not
pairwise stable.
PROOF — We know that in such a case, only two firms, i and imax, get
cash. In such an equilibrium, ki can get any value between 0 and ciD(pi) < K.
One then has ri = pi/ci, and rimax = 1 + γimaxD(pimax)(pimax − cimax)/kimax =
1+(1− kiciD(pi) )D(pimax)(pimax−cimax)/(K−ki). Consequently,
drimax
dki
=
∂rimax
∂ki
−
∂rimax
∂kimax
=
D(pimax )(pimax−cimax )
(K−ki)2
³
1− KciD(pi)
´
< 0 = dridki =
∂ri
∂ki
− ∂ri∂kimax . Hence,
the stability condition cannot hold.
PROPOSITION 4 — An allocation of cash {ki} is a pairwise stable equilib-
rium if and only if there exists i such that
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(i) ki = K; kj = 0, j 6= i
(ii) pi > ci
(iii) ∀j < i, pj/cj ≤ 1 + (pi−ci)D(pi)K .
PROOF — First, we prove that an allocation which satisfies (i)-(iii) is an
equilibrium. As firm i gets all the cash, it gets all the demand. Because of
(2), it is unconstrained, and we have ri = 1 +
(pi−ci)D(pi)
K . As pi > ci, ri > 1.
(iii) then implies that rj = pj/cj < ri for j < i, while as i = imax, we have
rj = 1 < ri for j > i. Thus we have an equilibrium.
To prove that (i)-(iii) is necessary, we rule out other equilibria. Because of
Lemmas 3 and 4, we only have to rule out other 1-firm allocations. Consider
such an allocation where ki = K, but which violates (ii): then ri < 1. Because
of assumption 2, there exists j 6= i such that rj ≥ 1. Thus this cannot be an
equilibrium. Assume then that (ii) holds but not (iii): that implies that rj > ri
for some j < i. Again, that cannot be an equilibrium. This rules out other
1-firm equilibria.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 has a number of implications.
First, there always exists an equilibrium, which we will refer as the ”minimal”
one. That equilibrium consists in giving all the cash to firm i (the ”minimal
firm”) such that i = min{i, pi > ci}, which exists since the relevant set is non
empty, and satisfies (iii) since the LHS of that condition is lower than 1. Thus,
giving all the cash to the lowest price profitable firm is an equilibrium.
Second, the minimal equilibrium need not be unique, as long as a firm’s
rate of return dominates that of cheaper firms by enough so that condition (iii)
holds, we can construct an equilibrium where all cash goes to that firm. Cheaper
firms cannot get financed despite being profitable, because the dominant firm
has a higher markup and yields a higher rate of return. Therefore, some degree
of ”monopoly power” is sustainable in equilibrium; there is indeterminacy as
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savers can coordinate on different levels of monopoly power.
Third, if K is arbitrarily large, (iii) can only hold for the minimal firm. If
cash is abundant, the dominant firm’s rate of return is close to 1, because it uses
only a small fraction of its cash. Deviating by giving a small amount cash to a
cheaper, profitable, firm yields a higher return, because it will attract a small
number of lucky customers and use all its cash to serve them. Consequently,
no cheaper firm may be profitable and one must be at the minimal equilibrium.
Therefore, it is the relative scarcity of cash which sustains nonminimal equilibria.
If cash is abundant enough, the unique equilibrium is the one which resembles
most the Walrasian one, given the constraints imposed on the model, i.e. the
minimal one.
Fourth, the equilibria are not optimal from the point of view of social welfare;
the firm yielding the highest surplus may not be eligible for equilibrium; for
example, it is easy to construct examples where it is not profitable.
Consider now again the case where all firms have the same cost c. We have
seen that the highest surplus firm is either the minimal firm or the highest
price, unprofitable firm. Therefore, the minimal equilibrium comes as close as
possible to the optimum. If there is enough cash, it is the only equilibrium. If the
number of firms is large enough, and if prices are drawn from some distribution
with full support, its price is arbitrarily close to c, i.e. it is arbitrarily close to
maximizing social surplus. In such a situation, the model closely replicates the
standard partial equilibrium Walrasian model.
This section has described a situation where savers know the rate of return
of each firm prior to financing them. In such a situation, unprofitable firms do
not get any cash; relative to the minimal equilibrium, there is a bias in favor
of firms with a high markup, not in favor of unprofitable undercutters. The
less cash is available, the higher the markup that can be sustained. A priori, an
equilibrium is not socially optimal and the social optimum is not an equilibrium.
But if costs are the same across firms and cash is abundant, the only equilibrium
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is the minimal one, which comes close to maximizing surplus. The larger the
number of firms, the closer the equilibrium to the social optimum.
5 Equilibrium with new entrants
We now consider a more complex situation where in addition to existing firms
whose rate of return is known, there are new entrants whose rate of return is un-
known. Savers must now decide how to allocate their cash between incumbents
and new entrants.
It is now harder to prove analytical results. Therefore, I confine myself to a
simple case, where there is one incumbent, whose rate of return is observed, and
one entrant, whose rate of return is not observed. I assume that the incumbent’s
price and cost, pI and cI , are observed. So is the entrant’s cost, cE. However, the
entrant’s price, p, is drawn from a distribution, with density f(p), and support
[pmin, pmax]. In order to restrict the number of cases to be analyzed, I will assume
that K > (cE + cI)D(pI) and that K > cED(pmin).
I want to check whether an equilibrium can arise where the entrant gets an
amount of capital equal to kE and the incumbent gets K − kE.
Depending on kE and on the realization of the shock p, four regimes may
arise:
A. The entrant underbids the incumbent, and is constrained by its cash. This
configuration arises if the incumbent charges a price p < pI , and if cED(p) > kE,
or equivalently p < p∗(kE) = D−1(kE/cE). Note that p∗ is a decreasing function
of kE.
In such a case, the rate of return to the entrant is
rE(p, kE) = p/cE.
The incumbent sells (1− kEcED(p))D(pI) units, thus getting a rate of return equal
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to
rI(p, kE) = 1 + (pI − cI)(1−
kE
cED(p)
)
D(pI)
K − kE
.
B. The entrant underbids the incumbent, and gets the whole market. That
happens provided p < pI and p > p∗(kE). In this case, we have
rE(p, kE) = 1 + (p− cE)
D(p)
kE
,
and
rI(p, kE) = 1.
C. The incumbent underbids the entrant, and is cash-constrained. This
happens if p > pI , and cID(pI) > K − kE. We then have
rE(p, kE) = 1 + (p− cE)(1−
K − kE
cID(pI)
)
D(p)
kE
,
rI(p, kE) =
pI
cI
.
D. Finally, if cID(pI) < K − kE, the incumbent may underbid the entrant
and get the whole market. In this case we have
rE(p, kE) = 1
and
rI(p, kE) = 1 + (pI − cI)
D(pI)
K − kE
.
These computations allow us to characterize equilibria. A pairwise stable
equilibrium is a value of kE such that
(i) kE = 0 and E(rI) =
R pmax
pmin
rI(p, kE)f(p)dp >
R pmax
pmin
rE(p, kE)f(p)dp =
E(rE), or
(ii) kE = K and E(rI) < E(rE),or
(iii) 0 < kE < K, E(rI) = E(rE), and ddkE (E(rI)−E(rE)) > 0.
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5.1 Corner equilibria
A straightforward step is to try and transpose the results of Proposition 4 and
characterize an equilibrium where one firm gets all the cash. It is easy to
compute such corner equilibria:
PROPOSITION 5 —
(i) kE = 0 is a pairwise stable equilibrium if and only if
(pI − cI)D(pI)
K
>
Z pI
pmin
p− cE
cE
f(p)dp
(ii) kE = K is a pairwise stable equilibrium if and only if
Z pmax
pmin
p− cE
K
D(p)f(p)dp >
pI − cI
cI
D(pI)(1− F (pI)).
PROOF — Integrating cases A,B,C, and D above, we find that
-for kE < cED(pI),
E(rI)−E(rE) =
R pI
pmin
h
(pI − cI)(1− kEcED(p) )
D(pI)
K−kE −
p−cE
cE
i
f(p)dp
+(pI − cI) D(pI)K−kE (1− F (pI));
-for cED(pI) < kE < K − cID(pI),
E(rI)−E(rE) =
Rmax(p∗(kE),pmin)
pmin
h
(pI − cI)(1− kEcED(p) )
D(pI)
K−kE −
p−cE
cE
i
f(p)dp
−
R pI
max(p∗(kE),pmin)
(p− cE)D(p)kE f(p)dp+ (pI − cI)
D(pI)
K−kE (1− F (pI));
-for kE > K − cID(pI),
E(rI)−E(rE) =
Rmax(p∗(kE),pmin)
pmin
h
(pI − cI)(1− kEcED(p) )
D(pI)
K−kE −
p−cE
cE
i
f(p)dp
−
R pI
max(p∗(kE),pmin)
(p−cE)D(p)kE f(p)dp+
R pmax
pI
h
pI−cI
cI
− (p− cE)
³
1− K−kEcID(pI)
´
D(p)
kE
i
f(p)dp.
Substituting kE = K and kE = 0 into these formulas yields (i) and (ii).
Q.E.D.
5.2 The truncation effect
It is easy to see that Proposition 5 implies that there may be multiple equilibria.
Take the simple case where pI = cI . In such a case, condition (i) is equivalent
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to
E(p− cE | p < pI) < 0,
while condition (ii) is equivalent to
E((p− cE)D(p)) > 0. (5)
Clearly, they may both simultaneously hold. For kE = 0 to be an equilib-
rium, we need that the expectation of the entrant’s price, conditional on being
lower than the incumbent, is lower than its cost. For kE = K to be an equilib-
rium, we just need that the entrant has positive expected profits. What is at
work is the usual pecuniary externality, but here it has a richer interpretation.
Assume the incumbent gets all the cash, and consider whether it is profitable to
give one unit of cash to the entrant, whose price is not observed. Such an entrant
will attract customers only if it underbids the incumbent. This makes it dispro-
portionately likely that it will charge a price below cost. On the other hand, if
the entrant gets all the cash, then it will have all the market even if it charges
more than the incumbent. As long as the entrant is on average profitable, savers
do not want to give one unit of cash to the incumbent, which — in the case where
pI = cI — just breaks even. For example, for a constant demand D(p) = D¯, con-
dition (5) is equivalent to E(p− cE) > 0. Since E(p− cE) > E(p− cE | p < pI),
we can construct distributions f() such that multiple equilibria hold.
The equilibrium where all the cash goes to the incumbent is ”stagnant”,
while the equilibrium where it goes to the entrant is ”turbulent”, in that the
entrant will sometimes make losses, and then (in a richer model) go bankrupt.
If the entrant has lower costs than the incumbent (cE < cI), then productivity
is higher in the equilibrium where the entrant gets all the cash.
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5.3 The demand effect: interior equilibria
Against the truncation effect runs the demand effect, which creates a force for
interior equilibria rather than corner equilibria. The demand effect comes from
the fact that D(p) is decreasing, so that an unconstrained firm will sell more
when it is underpricing than when it is overpricing. This tends to push down the
value of E((p− cE)D(p)). On the other hand, a constrained firm does not serve
all its demand, and the demand effect disappears for such a firm. In principle,
we can thus construct examples where E(rE) < E(rI) for kE = 0 and E(rI) >
E(rE) for kE = k. By continuity, there then exists an interior equilibrium, where
both the entrant and the incumbent get a positive fraction of cash. For such
a situation to be possible, the demand effect must be strong enough, i.e. the
elasticity of demand may be large enough. Let us go back to the case where
pI = cI . To get a configuration such that there is an interior equilibrium and no
corner equilibrium, we need that E((p− cE)D(p)) < 0 < E(p− cE | p < pI). If
D(p) is elastic enough, it will give more weights to low prices, relative to high
prices, than truncation at p = pI , and the inequality may hold. For example,
take the case where both demand and the distribution of prices are exponential:
D(p) = e−γp, f(p) = λe−λp.We find that E((p−cE)D(p)) = − λλ+γ cE+
λ
(λ+γ)2 .
Thus, it is negative if and only if
cE >
1
λ+ γ
.
On the other hand, E(p− cE | p < pI) = 1λ − cE− pIe
−λpI
1−e−λpI , which is positive
if and only if
cE <
1
λ
− pIe
−λpI
1− e−λpI .
A range of cE exists for which the equilibrium is interior, if 1λ+γ <
1
λ −
pIe
−λpI
1−e−λpI , i.e.
γ
λ(γ + λ)
>
pIe
−λpI
1− e−λpI .
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That is more likely to hold, the greater the slope of the demand curve (the
higher γ). It is also more likely if pI is neither too large nor too small.
6 Conclusion
This paper has considered the broad issue of how markets select between bound-
edly rational firms. I have narrowed the discussion by focusing on a static model
where bounded rationality amounts to charging a fixed, exogenous price, and
where the engine of selection is the allocation of cash by rational savers. I have
highlighted the existence of a pecuniary externality which is due to the fact that
reallocating cash in favor of one firm affects the customer base of another firm.
The key result is that if cash is scarce enough, one can sustain an equilibrium
where cash goes to ”overpricers” rather than underpricers. Furthermore, the
pecuniary externality generates multiple equilibria. When there are entrants
with unobserved rates of return, there are equilibria where all cash goes to
the entrant and equilibria where all cash goes to the incumbent. Because of
the pecuniary externality, these two types of equilibria may co-exist for the
same set of parameters. The equilibria where the entrant gets the cash involve
”bankruptcy” in the sense that the entrant will sometimes make losses.
From there, where can research go? The present model, in its version with
entrants, is a rudimentary theory of venture capital which yields some insights on
how the allocation of cash between entrants and incumbents affects the market
as a whole. An appealing idea, based on traditional Schumpeterian views of
creative destruction, is that entrants are the engine of growth and have lower
costs than incumbents. A natural research direction is therefore to extend the
model and turn it into a growth model. That would be useful to analyze the role
played by bounded rationality and financial institutions in shaping the process of
technological change. Such a model would also yield insights on the interactions
between growth and ‘turbulence’, since, as suggested here, faster growth would
be associated with a greater fraction of cash going to incumbents, who are more
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likely to fail.4
Another research direction would be relaxing the assumption that savers are
rational, and assume that they gradually learn an optimal rule of thumb for
allocating their savings between entrants and incumbents. From that process
would emerge an endogenous ‘attitude’ of savers toward risk, that would have
a critical impact of the growth process.
Finally, one could clearly allow for a richer behavior of firms and for pricing
rules that are not totally rigid (research along these lines in rather different con-
texts include Anagnostopoulos et al. (2005) and Saint-Paul (2005)). Intuitively,
some of this paper’s insights should remain to the extent that underpricing and
overpricing remain a characteristic of certain firms.
4The model would capture the ”selection” aspects of capitalism rather than the voluntary
rent-seeking aspects, that are emphasized by the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model.
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